angry that he was assumed to be making positive assertion of much he
regarded as speculative and to be discussed. I find it more or less
impossible to find the sensitive, speculative dialogue he wanted. I
don't see this as having much to do with pondering on some certainty
of being, but in the realisation that we don't make much collective
effort around freedom from myths and an inertial hostility we cover
with manners and law. We stick too readily with a form of philosophy
that cannot move to action in creating a different form of society.
Wittgenstein can be understood as saying philosophy is trapped in the
same old questions and that language somehow does this to us, but this
is not enough. The same old crud keeps asserting itself over long and
short duration in human history. We remain apes with increasingly
dangerous toys.
The problems with radical doubt and various forms of solipsism is a
lack of understanding of structural realism and the consequences of
what we can reasonably believe, rather than apply doubting to as a
means of refusing reality. Georges has often applied the term
'village idiocy' and I have to admit I broadly agree - the problem
being this asserts a kind of superiority we don't really want as
pretty much any bunch of zealous loonies can and do this. Radical
Islam is a current classic in which other Muslims can be killed
because they aren't proper Muslims and so on. "Chosen people" have
been a problem from Moses to the Nazis and beyond. I suspect the
questions are about how to be tolerant in possession of knowledge and
power and how we can develop a means of talking to power and
restricting the illegitimate use of authority. Einstein once quipped
that god had punished him for his rebellion against authority by
making him one. We know that standard objective voices are no such
thing and actually replete with prejudices, yet where do we know this
from? At the same time as this we also know that anarchy can easily
collapse into banditry and want so presence that we can reasonably
regard as objective, even if not perfect. God's Party fires rockets
at Israel and Gaza is destroyed as we think. There is probably tin in
my computer extracted by slave labour in the Congo and Coltan in my
mobile ripped out of Rwanda without doing anything about justice and a
decent society. Such matters lead to radical doubt about sitting in
warm rooms spanking the monkey of philosophy. My belief, seemingly
ridiculous at face value, is that we have no easily available
descriptive language at all. This takes some fleshing out, and
Descartes failed. I believe we will only be able to start in a
radical understanding of power in communication. Yet this power or
desire seems in constant return - almost like a website pop-up one
doesn't want. Endless literature is available (Orwell, Habermas,
Zizek, Derrida, Lyotard and on), but this has its own cliques of
power.
A blog at Oxford has set the question 'how might we better believe
what we know' but somehow its language is disappointing and set in a
chronic elite problematic. Life goes on, but like a warm room monkey
spanker, the answer seems to be about leaving society behind.
On 15 Feb, 22:25, chazwin <chazwy...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Cogito Ergo Sum is not a necessary conclusion.
>
> On Feb 14, 8:05 pm, Joseph Polanik <jpola...@nc.rr.com> wrote:
>
> > Contingent A Priori
>
> > Pierre-Normand Houle wrote:
> > >Larry Tapper wrote:
>
> > >>It was Snell's thesis, based on textual analysis, that the Greeks of
> > >>Homer's time lacked a unitary concept of mind, which took shape some
> > >>time between Homer and Aristotle. Hence the title of Snell's book, The
> > >>Discovery of the Mind (1946).
>
> > >>This came up a year or so ago in the context of Kelvin M's
> > >>contention (following Chalmers, he thought) that a pre-scientific
> > >>conceptual analysis of 'consciousness', if done properly, would be
> > >>good enough to last forever. I pointed out that he if he was right
> > >>about that, then forget the evidence, Snell's thesis could be ruled
> > >>out a priori and his book consigned to the flames!
>
> > >You mustn't be a friend of the contingent a priori, Larry.
>
> > >Maybe it's possible to know a priori contingent features that are
> > >necessary for *our* (actual, culturally local and contemporary) minds
> > >but that are likely to change if and when we redefine ourselves, as a
> > >people.
>
> > in some sense a contingent a priori is similar to a forensic inference.
> > this is a form of logic in which one begins from a fact and concludes
> > that the logically necessary precondition(s) of that fact have been
> > satisfied.
>
> > for example, while cogito-style arguments are usually given in a form
> > that suggests deduction (eg I experience; therefore, I am), they can
> > also be presented as contingent a priori statements: given that I
> > experience, it is necessarily true that I am.
>
> > I am not a logically necessary precondition for the existence of the
> > universe. it existed for billions of years before I got here and will
> > continue for billions more after I am gone; but, here and now, given
> > that I experience (a contingent fact), it is necessarily true that I am.
>
> > I have used a similar forensic inference on my website to define 'am'
> > and, by extension, is:http://what-am-i.net/alpi_am_definition.htm
>
> > commentary is welcome.
>
> > Joe
>
> > --
> > Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
> > first person. --- H-N Castaneda
>
> > @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
> > http://what-am-i.net
> > @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group.
To post to this group, send email to epistemology@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to epistemology+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
No comments:
Post a Comment